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British Development in Alternative Dispute Resolution 
in Divorce* 
David Carey Miller** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A number of related factors can be identified in the British devel-
opments towards the availability of some form of alternative dispute 
resolution in divorce. Both English and Scots law have made adjust-
ments in recognition of the inevitability of widespread divorce in mod-
ern life. English law, especially, has attempted to protect the threatened 
family unit by introducing reconciliation requirements as part of a 
package of divorce reform; however, these devices have proved to be 
impotent. Reform of the substantive grounds of divorce has been fol-
lowed by some changes-or proposed changes-to the traditional con-
test based procedure. 
Most recently, the focus of attention has shifted towards concilia-
tion processes which, on the premise of unavoidable divorce, place the 
emphasis upon reducing the destructive intensity of litigation. These 
developments will be covered under the following headings: The move 
to easy divorce in English and Scots law; Reconciliation and concilia-
tion: responses to the problem of increasing divorce; Reform of proce-
dure; and, The growing role of conciliation. 
II. THE MovE To EASY DIVORCE IN ENGLISH AND ScoTs LAw 
In Britain, the post-war era produced a dramatic decline in matri-
monial stability. Consequently, in both legal systems of the United 
Kingdom, the law has moved away from the previously pervasive no-
tion of matrimonial fault as a basis for divorce. Matrimonial fault has 
been replaced by the concept of "retrievable breakdown" which has 
ushered in an era of easy, or relatively easy, divorce. 1 The inevitability 
• A paper given at the lOth Brigham Young University Family Law Symposium on 
September 25, 1986. 
•• B.A. LL.B. (Natal.), L.L.M. (Edin.), P.h.D. (Aberd.). Series Lecturer, Department of 
Jurisprudence, University of Aberdeen. 
1. See, England Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, § 1; Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1976, § 1. 
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of this, in modern circumstances, was beyond question. Indeed, even the 
Church of England recognized the compelling case for reform: 
[A) divorce law founded on the doctrine of breakdown would not only 
accord better with the social realities than the present law does, but 
would have the merit of showing up divorce for what in essence it 
is-not a reward for marital virtue on the one side and a penalty for 
marital delinquence on the other; not a victory for one spouse and a 
reverse for the other; but a defeat for both, a failure of the marital 
"two-in-ship" in which both its members, however unequal their re-
sponsibility, are inevitably involved together. 2 
Despite this general recognition of reform, there was concern by many 
that the relaxation of divorce requirements would lead to an ever-in-
creasing divorce rate. These fears seem to be justified. 
Even though a high incidence of divorce can not be wholly 
ascribed to ease of termination of the matrimonial relationship,3 there 
has been a considerable increase in the divorce rate in both England 
and Scotland following the reforming legislation." Latest figures indi-
cate that marriage in the United Kingdom has decreased, while the 
divorce rate has increased.5 The divorce rate in the United Kingdom 
has increased more dramatically in the recent past than in the United 
States,6 confounding the general British view that any widespread ten-
dency to terminate marriage at will is a trans-Atlantic phenomenon. 
Recognition of the inevitability of an increased divorce rate has led 
to a shift in emphasis. Interest now tends to be less on how divorce can 
be stopped and more on how its damaging consequences can be allevi-
ated. At the root of this shift is the concern for the welfare and well-
being of children. There is a deep but inarticulate fear that serious 
social implications growing from the effects of divorce on children may 
2. Society for Propagation of Christian Knowledge, A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY 
SociETY, para. 26 (1966). 
3. CI.IVE, THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE IN SCOTLAND, 441 (2nd ed. 1982) (hereinaf-
ter, Clive) contends that there is no evidence for the proposition that easier divorce leads to a less 
responsible attitude towards marriage. The law, however, has long reflected an entrenched view 
that easier divorce would tend to undermine the stability of marriage. This was noted in the recent 
Booth Report but the committee was "[N]ot convinced that the procedure by which a marriage is 
to be dissolved has any bearing upon the reason why that marriage has failed." See REPORT OF 
THE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES PROCEDURE CoMMITTEE, para. 2.12 (hereinafter BOOTH REPORT). 
4. In Scotland the introduction of easier divorce in the 197 6 Act produced a rapid increase in 
the annual divorce rate: by 1979 the 1977 total of 4,775 had leapt to 8,972. See CI.IVE, supra note 
3, at 440-41. 
5. The number of marriages in the U.K. fell from 396,000 in 1984 to 393,000 in 1985. In 
1984 158,000 final divorce orders were granted and in 1985 the figure had risen to 175,000. See 
Governmental Statistical Serv., SociAL TRENDS 46, 49 (1987), (hereinafter SoCIAL TRENDS). 
6. 375o/o as against 208o/o over the period 1965 to 1980. Demographic Y.B. 517-18, U.N. 
Doc. ST /ESA/STAT /SER.R/13, U.N. Sales No. E/F. 84.XIII.1 (1983). 
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exist. The opening sentences of a recent document from the Law Com-
mission expresses this fear in statistical terms: "Thirty years ago only 
about 20,000 children were involved in divorce but in 1984 there were 
144,501 divorces7 and 58% of these involved one or more children 
under the age of 16: in total 148,600 children."8 
The stark-and to many unattractive-facts of the state of the na-
tion's matrimonial well-being has led to concern for preserving the 
family unit from a natural pragmatism: the best must be made of an 
irreversibly high incidence of divorce. When children are involved, 
modern thinking tends to focus upon minimizing the suffering and 
damage caused by termination of marriage. This has produced some 
imaginative radical thinking about the process of divorce. 9 
III. RECONCILIATION AND CoN CILIA noN: REsPoNsEs TO THE 
PROBLEM OF INCREASING DIVORCE 
A. Reconciliation and Conciliation Defined 
In the United Kingdom two main strands in the response to esca-
lating divorce have been defined: reconciliation and conciliation. As a 
matter of language the distinction is somewhat arbitrary but it repre-
sents an important conceptual difference: that between an attempt to 
repair the relationship and save the marriage; and, on the premise of 
actual termination, the decision to proceed with divorce but with the 
aim of, as far as possible, moderating the degree of contentiousness and 
easing the process for those involved. 
The Finer Repore0-a document which has been highly influen-
tial in the field of family law-first applied the distinction as a matter 
of definition: 
By reconciliation we mean the reuniting of the spouses. By concilia-
tion we mean assisting the parties to deal with the consequences of 
the established breakdown of their marriage, whether resulting in a 
7. These figures refer to England and Wales only. 
8. Law Reform Commission, 150,000 Children Divorced a Year: Who Cares?, 1986, at 1 (a 
memorandum published by The Law Commission, Conquest House, 37-38 John Street, The-
olbalds Road. London WC1N2BQ). The writings of Dr. John Bowlby demonstrate the impor-
tance of stable affectionate bonds to a child's health and psychological development. See generally 
BowLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss 1-3 (1969, 1979, 1980). For a concise work of general rele-
vance see BOWLBY, THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF AFFECTIONAL BONDS (1979). 
9. This radical thinking is not limited only to the United Kingdom because the same 
problems have had to be faced in many countries. Indeed, a greater measure of radical reform has 
occurred elsewhere. See, e.g., Australian Family Law Act, Austl. Acts, 374, 1975 providing a 
process integrating the traditional judicial form with reconciliation and conciliation functions. 
10. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ONE-PARENT FAMILIES, vols. J & 2, 1974, Cmnd. No. 
5629 (hereinafter FINER REPORT). The Committee was chaired by the Hon. Sir Morris Finer. 
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divorce or a separation, by reaching agreements or giving consents or 
reducing the area of conflict upon custody, support, access to and edu-
cation of the children, financial provision, the disposition of the matri-
monial home, lawyers' fees, and every other matter arising from the 
breakdown which calls for a decision on future arrangements. 11 
B. Introduction of Reconciliation In England 
In England, the introduction of some form of reconciliation proce-
dure was mooted in 1946 when the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Jowitt, 
appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Denning 
to examine divorce practice and to consider whether any machinery 
should be made available for the purpose of attempting a reconciliation 
between the parties, either before or after proceedings had been com-
menced. The Denning Report was not optimistic about the prospects of 
reconciliation procedures built into the adversary trial process: 
The prospects of reconciliation are much more favorable in the 
early stages of marital disharmony than in the later stages. At that 
stage both parties are likely to be willing to co-operate in an effort to 
save the marriage; but if the conflict has become so chronic that one 
or both of the parties has lost the power or desire to co-operate fur-
ther, the prospects sharply diminish. By the time the conflict reaches 
a hearing in the divorce court, the prospects are as a rule very small. 12 
Despite these reservations the Law Commission13 recommended 
that reconciliation procedures he built into the divorce process. Today, 
a number of provisions in the governing Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
aim to preserve the marriage. One textbook writer has implied that the 
emphasis upon reconciliation followed, almost as a matter of dogma, 
from the newly introduced unitary basis of divorce in irretrievable 
breakdown. 1" Certainly, reconciliation becomes a logical and legitimate 
option when divorce is no longer seen as a right to terminate on the 
basis of matrimonial fault. 
11. /d. vol. 1, at 176. 
12. REPORT OF THE CoMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE IN MATRIMONIAL CAUSES, Final Report, 
1947, Cmnd. No. 7024, at 10. This conclusion was shared by a Royal Commission under the 
chairmanship of Lord Morton of Henryton: "If matters are allowed to develop into a condition of 
chronic disharmony one or perhaps both of the spouses will probably have lost the ability or desire 
to make any attempt to restore the marriage, and by the time steps have been taken to institute 
divorce proceedings the prospects of bringing husband and wife together again are greatly re-
duced." REPORT OF THE RoYAL CoMMISSION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1956, Cmnd. No. 
9678. 
13. The Law Commission, REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE - THE FIELD OF 
CHOICE, Cmnd 3123 (hereinafter REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE). 
14. P.M. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 228 (6th ed. 1981). 
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Another writer has provided a perceptive analysis of the relation-
ship between the touchstone of irretrievable breakdown and 
reconciliation: 
[T]he fact that irretrievable breakdown is now the central con-
cept of the law of divorce indirectly offers to the word "reconciliation" 
an opportunity to achieve a new primary meaning. The reason is this. 
Although it would be both impossible and undesirable to contain 
within the bounds of a rigid definition the notion that a marriage has 
broken down irretrievably, it is permissible to expect the development 
of some consistency in the understanding of the notion. In fact the 
language of the Act suggests something negative in the way of defini-
tion: a marriage has broken down irretrievably when there is no "pos-
sibility of a reconciliation between the parties." The greater the per-
ceived prospect of reconciliation the closer the court comes to being 
satisfied ... that the marriage has not broken down irretrievably.u 
This reformed position provides for divorce within a context recog-
nizing that reconciliation should be encouraged.16 The departure from 
fault based divorce, strong in notions of contest and penalty, has intro-
duced the possibility of liberating the divorce procedure from its former 
limitations. The provision for reconciliation, complementary to divorce 
based upon irretrievable breakdown of marriage, is a perfectly consis-
tent compromise and, of course, one which reflects the policy that, if 
possible, the marriage should be preserved. 17 
The provisions for reconciliation, first introduced in the Divorce 
Reform Act 1969, are now contained in section six of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973. Sub-section (1) states that the rules of court shall 
provide for certification by the petitioner's attorney whether he has ad-
vised his client to seek reconciliation. Sub-section (2) empowers a court, 
mero motu, to adjourn proceedings when the court finds that a reasona-
ble possibility of reconciliation exists between the parties to the 
marnage. 
Experimental machinery to implement these legislative principles 
15. Griew, Marital Reconciliation - Contexts and Meanings, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 294, 305 
(1972). 
16. The reforms represent a change of direction rather than a radical break with the past 
and any assessment is likely to depend upon the point of view of the commentator; one may note, 
for example, the view expressed by Lisa Parkinson: "The attempt to superimpose the concept of 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage on top of the concept of the matrimonial offense has produced 
a kind of historical and moral layercake, in which a thin layer of twentieth century liberalism has 
been spread over a thick slab of Victorian moral values." L. PARKINSON, CoNCILIATION IN SEPA-
RATION AND DIVORCE, 16 (1986) (hereinafter PARKINSON). 
17. The Law Commission in its report REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE, supra note 
13, at 10, recognized that good divorce law should seek "[ t ]o buttress, rather than to undermine, 
the stability of marriage . . . . " 
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was initially set up locally; but later, these principles were made availa-
ble in the form of a written practice direction. The provisions lay down 
a procedure which allows the court to refer a case to the court welfare 
officer because there appears to be a reasonable possibility of reconcili-
ation, or because the court feels that conciliation might serve a useful 
purpose. 18 
C. The Impotency of Reconciliation in England 
For the operation of reconciliation to be meaningful, one must set 
the scene of the grounds for divorce within which reconciliation oper-
ates. Here it should be emphasized that, in practice, the changes have 
not produced any significant deviation in the circumstances of increas-
ing divorce. 
As stated above, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 introduced "ir-
retrievable breakdown" as the sole basis for divorce; but, in truth, the 
legislation provides for five different factual conditions which may con-
stitute irretrievable breakdown. Regardless of the circumstances alleged, 
all petitions are subject to a bar to divorce within one year of mar-
riage.19 Arguably, this is consistent with the policy implicit in the no-
18. The full text of the practice direction is as follows: 
(a) Where the court considers that there is a reasonable possibility of reconciliation or 
that there are ancillary proceedings in which conciliation might serve a useful purpose, 
the court may refer the case, or any particular matter or matters in dispute therein, to 
the court welfare officer. (b) The court welfare officer will, after discussion with the 
parties, (experience having shown that reconciliation is unlikely to be successful in the 
absence of readiness to cooperate on the part of the spouses) or that conciliation might 
assist the parties to resolve their disputes or any part of them by agreement. (c) If the 
court welfare officer decides that there is not such reasonable prospect, he should report 
accordingly to the court. (d) If the court welfare officer decides that there is some rea-
sonable prospect of reconciliation, or that conciliation might assist the parties to resolve 
their disputes or any part of them by agreement, he will, unless he continues to deal 
with the case himself, refer the parties to either (i) a probation officer, or (ii) a fully 
qualified marriage guidance counselor recommended by the branch of the appropriate 
organization concerned with marriage guidance and welfare; or (iii) some other appro-
priate person or body indicated by the special circumstances (e.g. denominational) of 
the case. (e) The person to whom the parties have been referred will report back to the 
court welfare officer, who in turn will report to the court. These reports will be limited 
to a statement whether or not reconciliation has been effective, or to what extent (if at 
all) the parties have been assisted by conciliation to resolve their disputes or any part of 
them by agreement." 1 All E.R. 894 (1971). 
19. Section 1 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 repealed § 3 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in terms of which no petition could be presented within three years 
of marriage unless the court gave leave on the basis of, either, exceptional hardship suffered by the 
petitioner, or, exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent. These criteria to allow relief 
from the three year bar proved to be unworkable - see Fay v. Fay, 2 All E.R. 922 (1982) -
hence the reform unconditionally barring the commencement of proceedings within one year of 
marriage; a reform which was probably the primary factor in a 6% increase in the number of 
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tion of irretrievable breakdown; it is hardly possible to say that a mar-
riage has irretrievably broken down if it has not endured for a 
reasonable period. The conditions which may constitute proof of irre-
trievable breakdown are provided for in section (2) of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 which states in pertinent part: 
(a) that the respondent has committed adultery and the petJtwner 
finds it impossible to live with the respondent; (b) that the respondent 
has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be 
expected to live with the respondent; (c) that the respondent has de-
serted the petitioner for a continuous period of at least two years im-
mediately preceding the presentation of the petition; (d) that the par-
ties of the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of at 
least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition 
... and the respondent consents to a divorce being granted; (e) that 
the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of 
at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the peti-
. 20 twn .... 
Despite these factual conditions the most usual cause of action in di-
vorce amounts to an allegation of fault, and reconciliation is hardly ever 
resorted to once legal proceedings have commenced. The new English 
order of irretrievable breakdown, applied in a context of provisions en-
couraging reconciliation, has not, on the statistical evidence, achieved 
the Law Commission's objective of buttressing the stability of marriage. 
In 1969 the number of divorce petitions filed stood at 70,575. In 1971, 
when the new legislation came into operation, the figure was 110,017 
and by 1984 it had risen to 178 940-all within the context of a rela-
tively static total population.21 Hardly a morsel of approval of the rec-
onciliation procedures has come from the pens of the expert commenta-
tors. One, having been thoroughly dismissed in 1971,22 repeated the 
petitions filed over the previous year. See SociAL TRENDS, supra note 5, at 48. 
20. The bar to petitions within one year of marriage provided for in § 3(1) can only have 
practical effect in respect of facts (a) and (b) (adultery and behavior) because longer time limits 
are specifically prescribed in respect of petitions presented on facts (c), (d) and (e). 
21. PASSINGHAM & HARMER, LAW AND PRACTICE IN MATRIMONIAL CAUSt:S 2 (4th ed. 
1985) (hereinafter LAW AND PRACTICE). 
22. "The reconciliation provisions are a sham." Freeman, The Search for a Rational Di-
vorce, 24 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 178 210 (1971). This seemingly extreme statement may well 
be justified; as Lisa Parkinson has shown the efficacy of § 6(1) of the 1973 Act is questionable on 
the ground that technical compliance requires no more than certification by the petitioner's solici-
tor that he has not discussed with his client the possibility of reconciliation (it may be significant 
that the example of a standard certificate regarding reconciliation given in LAw AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 21, at 502, is to this negative effect). Moreover, a critical point is that the legal aid 
scheme does not cover what a solicitor might do by way of attempted reconciliation. This suggests, 
as Lisa Parkinson has put it, that " the law's apparent concern to facilitate reconciliation has been 
reserved for the minority whose financial means are above the prescribed limits." PARKINSON, 
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charge in 1978 and went on to question the principle and policy of 
reconciliation: 
Seven years ago I described the reconciliation provisions as a "sham" 
and I stand by what I said then .... Reconciliation has its dangers 
and pitfalls as well. It often operates under an ideology which empha-
sizes restoration of the equilibrium with a minimum of change. It 
makes the assumption that uniting the family, preserving family rela-
tionships, is an important social goal. Whether it is valuable or not 
must depend on the marriage and not on the value to society of stable 
marriages. 23 
D. Absence of Reconciliation Provisions in Scots Law 
Scots law, by contrast, has no active statutory requirement provid-
ing for reconciliation pending the granting of a divorce. 24 The Scottish 
Law Commission report211 which, eventually,26 led to reform of the 
grounds of divorce concluded that, "once an action has been raised, rec-
onciliation is pretty well out of the question."27 Moreover, there is no 
counterpart of the English law provisions requiring legal practitioners 
to draw a client's attention to marriage reconciliation agencies. The 
Scottish Law Commission took the view that this "would be an ineffec-
tive formality." 28 
The absence of Scottish provisions for compulsory reconciliation 
attempts during the course of divorce proceedings may possibly be 
taken to show skepticism for any vain attempt to restore a bolted mar-
riage to the matrimonial stable. This difference between Scots and En-
supra note 16, at 20. 
23. Freeman, When Marriage Fails - Some Legal Responses to Marriage Breakdown, 31 
CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS. 109, 120 (1978). See also, Levine, The Divorce Reform Act 1969, 33 
Mon. L. Rt:v. 632, 644 (1970); O'Neill, The Matrimonial Causes Act /97 3, 36 Mon. L. REv. 
638, 639 (1973). 
24. § 2(1) of the Divorce (Scotland) Act provides for the continuation of any pending action 
for such period as the court considers appropriate for the purpose of attempting remnciliation. 
25. Scottish Law Commission, DIVORO~: Tm: GROUNDS CoNSIDERED, 1967, Cmnd. No. 
3256 at 10 (hereinafter DIVORCf:: THE GROUNDS CoNSIDERED). 
26. The matter was controversial. The Church of Scotland Report of the Social and Moral 
Welfare Board to the General Assembly 1969, 460-70, favored a single ground of breakdown 
actionable after two years' separation. There were seven failed bills over a period of a many years 
before reforms, similar to those introduced in England in 1969, were achieved in Scotland in 1976. 
27. Supra note 25, at II. 
28. Supra note 25 at 32. The Court of Session, however, in a statement directed to practi-
tioners, has identified the desirability of an early referral to marriage guidance where appropriate: 
"[L]egal practitioners who are consulted about marital problems with a view to consistorial pro-
ceedings should try to identify, at as early a stage as possible. those cases in which the parties 
might benefit from the expert advice and guidance of a marriage counsellor, and in those cases 
should encourage the parties to seek such advice and guidance." Practice Note of II March 1977. 
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glish law, however, shows no indication that Scotland is less concerned 
with the preservation of marriage than Britain is. The Scottish reforms 
seem to reflect a greater pragmatism in not providing for formal at-
tempts at reconciliation after litigation has commenced.29 Moreover, 
Scots law may be seen to acknowledge the concept of matrimonial fault, 
in that, there is no overriding bar on all divorce pending the passing of 
a minimum period from the date of marriage. 
In Scotland, The Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, lists the factual cir-
cumstances which constitute irretrievable breakdown. These are: adul-
tery, behavior, and desertion. 30 The central grounds for divorce in mod-
ern Scots law was labeled "desertion" at common law. Desertion has 
built into it a policy which requires the expiry of a period of time, the 
length of which is determined by the circumstances. 
Modern Scots law, reflected in the Divorce (Scotland) Act 197 6, 
requires irretrievable breakdown of marriage as the sole ground for di-
vorce. Three of the five prescribed ways in which irretrievable break-
down can be established involve a "waiting period." Wilful desertion 
without reasonable cause is actionable if during a continuous two-year 
period following the desertion "there has been no cohabitation between 
the parties, and the pursuer has not refused a genuine and reasonable 
offer by the defender to adhere. " 31 A divorce may be granted on the 
grounds of non-cohabitation but only after a continuous five-year pe-
riod during which "there has been no cohabitation between the parties 
at any time ... " 32 unless the defender consents to the granting of a 
divorce in which case only a two-year period is applicable. 33 
Besides adultery34 the only other basis for proof of irretrievable 
breakdown is "behavior", the modern equivalent of "cruelty" in earlier 
law. Even here, the behavior complained of must be such "that the 
pursuer cannot reasonably be expected to cohabit with the defender." 311 
The leading modern authority on marriage has explained the operation 
of this requirement and commented that it is open to the court "to con-
clude that a spouse can reasonably be expected to live with behavior 
... which he or she finds intolerable."36 Because this issue must be 
29. E. M. Clive sees the 1976 Act as "[A] compromise between, on the one hand, a desire for 
non-fault divorce and, on the other, a desire for clear justiciable issues which would not necessitate 
a costly, time-consuming and counter-productive inquest into whether a marriage had really bro-
ken down." CLIVE, supra note 3, at 438. 
30. Divorce (Scotland) Act § I (2). 
31. Divorce (Scotland) Act§ 1(2)(c). 
32. /d. at § I (2)(e). 
33. /d. at § I (2)(d). 
34. /d. at § I (2)(a). 
35. /d. at § 1(2)(b). 
36. Cuvt:, supra note 3, at 447-48. 
58 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
determined at the time of trial "a divorce could be refused if the court 
were satisfied that a husband had reformed his ways since the acts 
complained of and that the pursuer could now reasonably be expected 
to cohabit with him."37 Moreover, the cohabitation contemplated an 
apparently long term. Conduct of a transient nature will not necessarily 
create an action. 38 It seems that even the "behavior" cause of action 
reflects, to some degree, the policy that spouses should persevere to 
make the marriage work. 
Scots law does not reflect the same overt policy requiring irre-
deemably breakdown which runs through the entire notion of divorce 
in modern English law. In Scotland, when the only basis for divorce is 
non-cohabitation, the policy is applied on a more selective basis, with 
emphasis on "giving the marriage a chance." It seems logical that the 
policy's strength diminishes when a divorce is sought because of adul-
tery or intolerable behavior. Indeed, it seems a strange paradox where 
the law, in its preoccupation with the preservation of marriage in an 
age of easy divorce, fails to recognize that there are situations in which 
immediate divorce is justified. 
Another striking difference between the English and Scottish sys-
tems is the apparent faith of English law in reconciliation provisions 
built into divorce procedure. Scots law has rejected reconciliation be-
cause it is seen as unlikely to achieve its objective. One other explana-
tion for the Scottish point of view is that there is a limit to the extent to 
which the law can minister to the ills of society. 
IV. REFORM OF PROCEDURES APPLYING TO DIVORCE 
Few would dispute the view that a comprehensive overhaul of the 
process of divorce is amply justified by changes which have occurred in 
post-war British society. Society has virtually abandoned any view that 
the family unit can be bolstered by restricting access to termination of 
the marriage relationship. The climate of a different attitude towards 
divorce has lead to a questioning of the appropriateness of applying the 
normal litigious dispute process in matters where personal relationships 
usually figure prominently.39 When children are involved the substan-
37. !d. at 447. 
38. Id. at 448. 
39. A comment in the BooTH REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 2.28, refers to the now well-
recognized argument: 
When matrimonial causes ceased to be a matter for the ecclesiastical courts they became 
subject to the general procedure which governed civil proceedings in England and 
Wales and thus were subject to the adversarial hearing and the procedures leading to it. 
The fundamental principle of such a hearing is that the court does not itself elicit 
information, but comes to its decision on evidence adduced before it. There was a 
49] DISPUTE RESOLUTION 59 
tive law has long recognized that overriding priority may have to be 
given to a child's best interests. The courts have acknowledged the view 
that how dissolution occurs may be very material to the extent to which 
a child is affected. 
Law reform, and especially comprehensive reform, only takes 
place where various conditions coexist; the status quo, in any given 
area, is very likely to prevail unless change, even though clearly war-
ranted, is specifically promoted by some strong motivating factor within 
favorable circumstances of feasibility and finance. In England the case 
for reform is especially pressing because of the confusion created by the 
historical overlap in matrimonial jurisdiction between divorce and mag-
istrates' courts. This confusion was only partially cured by the Domes-
tic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978. 
The influential Finer Committee Report, in 197 4, recommended 
the introduction of a unified family court incorporating a welfare ser-
vice!0 Support for the idea has grown and reform is now urged by a 
significant lobby.41 It seems that there are two connected strands of de-
velopment; first, an ongoing process of the reform of procedure and 
second, a significant growth in the recognition of the role of conciliation 
which had led to the quite rapid expansion in the availability of profes-
sional conciliation services. In Scotland the development has been in the 
growth of voluntary conciliation services; yet, there has been no indica-
tion that conciliation is likely to be built into formal divorce proce-
dure.42 For this reason, what follows only relates to English 
developments. 
A. Reform in England: The Booth Report 
When the dissolution of marriage appears to be a process in which 
the court in effect rubber stamps a form of actual or tacit resolution 
strongly held view that by its very nature an adversarial procedure enhances bitterness 
and hostility and encourages parties to embark upon a disputed case with ideas of 
'winning' or 'losing' very much in mind. 
40. FINER REPORT, supra note 10, vol. 1, at 173-76. 
41. Parkinson quotes the comment of Baroness Faithful in launching the Family Courts 
Campaign in 1985: "children and families simply cannot afford to wait another 20 years, when 
legal issues involving children and families have multiplied rapidly, but are still being dealt with 
in and out of date and confusing variety of court situation." PARKINSON, supra note 16, at 43. To 
date, English law has responded in characteristic fashion, by ad hoc change and piece-meal 
adjustment. 
42. In March 1985, an amendment to the Divorce (Scotland) Act providing statutory provi-
sions for reconciliation was introduced but abandoned after debate. See, HANSARD, 21 March 
1985. 
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arrived at by the parties, one can better understand the increasingly 
significant role of divorce procedure.'3 
Existing English divorce procedure dates from an age in which the 
substantive law of divorce was firmly rooted in the concept of fault. 
Prior to the introduction of "irretrievable breakdown" in 1971 all di-
vorce suits, whether defended or undefended, were heard in open court 
although the increase in the number of undefended divorces had al-
ready led to a more perfunctory hearing, typically consisting of unchal-
lenged evidence by the petitioner alone. The reform for the grounds of 
divorce did not touch the requirement of a formal hearing even though 
"by then the procedure had come to be generally regarded as an unnec-
essary, costly and degrading ordeal for the parties and an undignified 
end to a marriage." .. In 1973, however, a special procedure was intro-
duced to provide, in an undefended suit, for the issue of a decree of 
divorce or judicial separation upon the petitioner's affidavit without the 
need for a court appearance. Initially, this procedure applied only 
where there was no child under sixteen and where divorce proceeded 
on the basis of two year's separation with the respondent's consent. In 
1977, however, the procedure was extended to all undefended suits 
whether or not there were children. But besides this important change 
the procedure of divorce remains that of a past era;411 a particularly 
paradoxical situation given that the reforms of substantive law have 
actually elevated the importance of procedure. 
The vast majority of modern divorces are undefended and "di-
vorce" is essentially a matter of a signpost procedure rather than a judi-
cial process. Because of the domination of adjectival over substantive 
rules it obviously follows that the "atmosphere" of the legal process of 
divorce is largely determined by the nature of the procedure. Changing 
the way those involved respond and react involves reform of divorce 
procedure. 
The most influential up-to-date English thinking on the divorce 
process is contained in the Report of the Matrimonial Causes Proce-
dure Committee (Booth Report) published in 1985. This committee, 
43. Although the court remains subject to a statutory duty to inquire into the facts alleged (§ 
1(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973) the scope for this is limited in the usual modern unde-
fended divorce typically granted on the basis of the petitioner's affidavit and proof of service. 
However, where the divorce order sought provides for financial arrangements, or where there are 
children of the marriage, the court has a definite inquisitorial role. (See Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 §§ 24 and 41). 
44. BooTH Rt:PORT, supra note 3, at para. 2.3. See also, Murch, judicial Hearings of 
Undefended Divorce Petitions, 38 Mon. L. Rt:v. 609 (1975). 
45. See the BooTH REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 2.4: "Many of the present procedures are 
based upon the fault concept of divorce, and their origin can be traced back to the 1857 
statute . 
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chaired by the Honorable Mrs. Justice Booth, was created following a 
recommendation by the Law Commission, to examine the procedure 
and practice of divorce. The Committee's specific terms of reference 
were: 
to recommend reforms which might be made- (a) to mitigate the 
intensity of disputes; (b) to encourage settlements; and (c) to provide 
further for the welfare of the children and the family, having regard 
to the desirability of achieving greater simplification and the saving of 
costs!6 
The tenor of measures proposed by the Booth Committee is very 
clearly directed towards mitigating the contentious character of divorce 
proceedings. This is evidenced by a variety of recommendations for 
changes of the existing form and from proposals regarding a positive 
and central role for conciliation. The two aspects are complementary in 
that the suggested modifications to existing form are intended to pro-
duce a changed "atmosphere," more receptive to the notion of concilia-
tion. For example, it is proposed that where divorce is sought on ac-
count of the "behavior" of the other party47 -the most usual allegation 
of fact supporting a claim of irretrievable breakdown-no particulars of 
the behavior alleged should be given in the initiating document.48 
Responses to consultation carried out by the Booth Committee 
"generally acknowledged that lengthy and detailed particulars of be-
havior in the petition were unhelpful and could give rise to considerable 
bitterness between divorcing spouses."49 Similar thinking lies behind 
the proposal that joint applications for divorce should be competent 
where termination is sought on the basis of two years' separation and 
the consent of both spouses. 50 
V. THE GRoWING RoLE OF CoNCILIATION 
A. The Early Roots of Conciliation 
The central feature of the Booth Report-from the point of view 
of an alternative approach to the traditional form of resolution in di-
vorce-is the major role envisaged for an active process of conciliation. 
46. See BooTH REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 1.1. 
47. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, § 1(2)(b). 
48. To be an "Application for a Divorce" rather than a "petition" because the latter word -
deriving from the practice of the ecclesiastical courts and so synonymous with the concept of a 
matrimonial offence- "[i]ntroduces at the outset an accusatorial tone to the proceedings." See 
BooTH REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 4.3. 
49. /d., at para. 4.17. 
50. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, § 1 (2)(d). See BooTH REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 
4.6. 
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This vindicates the position of a growing body of those concerned with 
divorce111 that the emphasis upon conciliation is the best way forward in 
modern circumstances. This broadly accepted view by the various pro-
fessional practitioners is a natural response to day-to-day experience 
and the simple fact that a cooperative attitude between the spouses is 
beneficial to all parties affected by divorce and may well be a critical 
factor as far as children are concerned. As a matter of the philosophy of 
divorce the significant point of the Booth Report is a definite movement 
toward open negotiated agreements between the spouses within a 
framework designed to promote fairness and protect minor children.112 
Before looking at the relevant specific proposals of the Booth Com-
mittee concerning conciliation it is worth noting the most salient aspects 
of the development in divorce practice; a development which, of course, 
is the raison d'etre for the recommendations for reform. 113 
Although a practice of conciliation applied to divorce has been 
known for some time, its role, until relatively recently, was undefined 
and haphazard. 114 The crystallization of a concept of conciliation, within 
an accepted context, has only emerged recently. Two important factors 
in the development of an established notion of conciliation have been its 
recognition in the practice directive in 1971 and the clear identification 
accorded it in the 1974 Finer Report115 as a process distinct from recon-
ciliation. But, of course, recognition of the potential value of concilia-
tion is only a natural by-product of pioneering work done by social 
scientists. A significant development has been the collaboration between 
social welfare workers and psychologists in the immediate post-war 
era. 56 
What is striking about the development of conciliation from a 
51. Marriage guidance counselors, social workers, probation officers, court personnel, and 
legal practitioners. 
52. The committee's conception of conciliation shows the emphasis upon the role of the par-
ties: "It is of the essence of conciliation that responsibility remains at all times with the parties 
themselves to identify and seek agreement on the issues arising from the breakdown of their rela-
tionship. The conciliator's role is to assist the parties in this process." See BooTH REPORT, supra 
note 3, at para. 3. 10. 
53. In this I rely heavily on a recent work~the only British text on ronciliation in di-
vorce~by Lisa Parkinson, an established divorce conciliation practitioner who has been involved 
in the vanguard of developments. PARKINSON, supra note 16. 
54. A report, in 1936, on social services in courts of summary jurisdiction suggests that the 
use of conciliation was common in matrimonial causes but it seems that its primary role was "[i]n 
deflecting wives from legal action against their husbands." /d., at 58. 
55. FINER REPORT, supra note 10, at 67. 
56. The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations in London has had a major role in the 
development of both theory and practice and, importantly, in training programs. In 1948 a Family 
Discussion Bureau was formed by the Family Welfare Association with professional psychologist 
input from the Tavistork. See Institute of Human Relations, Social Casework in Marital 
Problems 3-10 (1955). 
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loose and even nebulous collection of ideas to a potentially important 
part of the machinery of modern divorce is the fact that a conservative 
legal system has, in little more than a decade, assimilated a process 
which is extra-legal in the sense that it works through ways not known 
to traditional legal means of dispute resolution. As suggested above, a 
primary factor in the "rapid growth of conciliation schemes from 
1975"117 has probably been the recognition of the nature of marriage as 
a relationship between consenting individuals open to possible termina-
tion by consent, subject to controls to promote fairness and to protect 
any children. Although conciliation is a concept in a sense foreign to 
the law, it does promote a number of objectives with which the legal 
system would identify. Conciliation is a response to various concerns 
with which the legal system would identify. These concerns include: 
1. Concern to provide an alternative to the adversarial system in the 
divorce courts. 2. Concern to protect children involved in their par-
ents' divorce. 3. Concern to give people more control over their own 
affairs and reduce their reliance on formal institutions. 4. Concern to 
achieve greater administrative efficiency by processing contested cases 
more quickly. 5. Concern to reduce public expenditure, particularly 
on legal aid. 6. Concern to stem the rising tide of divorce. 118 
The development of divorce conciliation in England has occurred in 
two broad forms: in-court and out-of-court. Significantly, however, both 
developments commenced in the Bristol area. 
B. In-court Conciliation 
In-court conciliation was initiated by the judiciary and court regis-
trars as an attempt to reduce the number of defended divorces. The 
system was based upon cooperation between court personnel, legal rep-
resentatives and probation service welfare officers designated to act in 
divorce conciliation.119 When a respondent defended a divorce action the 
parties and their solicitors were called before the registrar. The regis-
trar, after clarifying the issues in dispute, exercised his discretion as to 
the utility of suggesting that the parties have a private discussion with a 
welfare officer. The system proved effective, and under the distinguish-
ing label "mediation," the system was extended to undefended divorces 
where there was a dispute over custody or access. In the initial years 
the results from the system's operation proved promising. More than 
57. PARKINSON, supra note 16, at 67. 
58. /d., at 67-71 where the author expands on these points. 
59. On the special role of the probation service in the context of the summary jurisdiction of 
the English courts, see REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBATION SER-
VICE, 1962, Cmnd. No. 1650, at 50-57. 
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half of the cases proceeding to mediation were settled. In 1981 Bristol 
County Court Registrar Parmiter reported benefits to the parties and 
their children in the reduction of bitterness and more expeditious reso-
lution; moreover, savings in time and funds were beneficial to the sys-
tem as a whole. 60 Of course, the fact that the actual process of divorce 
is satisfactorily settled does not necessarily mean that the dispute is fi-
nally resolved especially in relation to the ongoing issues of mainte-
nance and access. A possible weakness of "in-court" conciliation or me-
diation is the natural tendency to judge success in terms of 
administrative efficiency, and to use as the primary criterion of satisfac-
tory resolution the achieving of an agreed basis for a court order. 61 
C. Out-of-court Conciliation 
An independent out-of-court conciliation service came into being in 
the mid-1970s through the initiative of certain members of a Bristol 
committee-the embryo of the Bristol Courts Family Conciliation Ser-
vice (BCFCS). The Bristol Committee's purpose was to work towards 
implementation of the Finer recommendations. The group, with input 
from academic and practicing lawyers as well as the welfare agencies, 
promoted general support for the notion of conciliation prior to the 
stage of judicial proceedings. Because the contemplated route for concil-
iation was the solicitor's office, the motivation of the legal profession 
was crucial. Yet, because the actual conciliation service would be pro-
vided by non-lawyers, the project was a joint one. Obtaining financial 
support was a major difficulty, but eventually the Lord Chancellor's 
Department backed the scheme and in 1978 the trustees of the Nuffield 
Foundation made a three-year grant to BCFCS conditional upon cen-
tral government providing in the second year one-third and in the third 
year two-thirds of the service's funding requirement.62 The pre-court 
services offered by BCFCS complemented the in-court conciliation 
available to divorce litigants at the Bristol County Court: 
a) in its early availability, before an application was made to the 
court and even before a divorce petition had been filed; b) in its quick 
accessibility in crisis situations, without the delay of awaiting a court 
appointment or for legal aid to be granted; c) in its availability to 
unmarried as well as married couples; d) in its acceptance of self-
60. See Parmiter, Bristol In-Court Conciliation Procedure, 78 LAw Soc'v. GAz. 196 
(1981). 
61. See PARKINSON, supra note 16, at 73. 
62. /d. at 75-76. 
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referrals from couples who were anxious to avoid any court proceed-
ings; e) in its independence of statutory authority.63 
D. Development of Conciliation In England 
65 
The 1980s have seen a mushrooming of conciliation services in 
both the independent out-of-court form and in the in-court form oper-
ating through the probation service. Nevertheless, from the point of 
view of regional spread, the development has been somewhat random, 
probably because local motivation is a key factor. 64 Importantly, how-
ever, certain developments do promote uniformity of approach between 
existing services. 
In 1983, the National Family Conciliation Council (NFCC) came 
into being as a result of efforts to coordinate conciliation services. Soon 
after its inauguration the NFCC joined with committees representing 
the legal profession to draw up a code of practice. In 1983, the Solici-
tors' Family Law Association, an influential body with over one thou-
sand members, adopted a code of professional practice with implications 
for conciliation. These developments point to the possibility of a major 
national rationalization in England but, inevitably, the respective mer-
its of the two systems then come into issue although, arguably, a case 
may be made for combining an independent system providing early 
conciliation with an in-court service. 
1. Conciliation and the judicial process 
It has been argued that conciliation is incompatible with the judi-
cial process; however, social changes-reflected in changes in the sub-
stantive law-may well warrant the modification of existing adjectival 
law as it applies to the termination of marriage and the necessary ancil-
lary decisions. The possibility of conciliation within the judicial process, 
or preferably, by referral from the judicial process to an independent 
service, should be open to parties despite the failure of an early attempt 
prior to the commencement of litigation. On the other hand, the con-
tinuity of a relatively successful early conciliation should surely be 
maintained regardless of the fact that the parties dispute has entered 
the stage of formal judicial proceedings. The legal process must reflect 
the substantive law and, of course, this means that it will be many-
faceted and open to development and change.611 The true position would 
63. !d. at 76. 
64. The development in Scotland has been solely through the growth of voluntary concilia-
tion but more on this later. 
65. "Those in dispute surrender the decision-making power to someone else, with the result 
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appear to be that modern English matrimonial causes procedure is in 
the process of responding to a demand to accommodate conciliation.66 
2. Recommendations by the Booth Committee 
The natural growth of conciliation schemes in various forms 
means that a relative plethora of models are available and considered 
rationalization can hardly proceed without an assessment of respective 
merits. But recent developments have made it clear that influential 
thinking would prefer to leave out-of-court conciliation as a local vol-
untary service. In-court conciliation, on the other hand, is likely to play 
a part, in some shape or form, in reformed divorce procedure. While 
recognizing the value of introducing conciliation at the earliest possible 
stage, the Booth Committee was concerned with divorce procedure, this 
naturally led it to in-court conciliation. It should be noted that the 
Booth Committee was reported in the light of the Report of the Inter-
departmental Committee on Conciliation, published in 1983. 
The Inter-departmental Committee had been established to review 
existing arrangements for conciliation, including cost implications, with 
a view to future developments. This report- by no means well re-
ceived in all quarters67 -favored the development of in-court concilia-
tion as part of the normal divorce process. Out-of-court conciliation, on 
the other hand, was thought to be better left as a voluntary service;68 
that the important meanings and values become those of a third party. But beyond this fundamen-
tal attribute of third-party decision, the characteristics of the process are almost infinitely variable. 
The model can accommodate a range of umpires from judges of a national legal system to private 
arbitrators chosen by the disputants; greater or less procedural formality (including more or less 
flexibility as to the manner in which the issues for decision are selected and presented); inquisito-
rial or adversarial procedures; variation in the criteria to be taken into account in decision-making; 
the presence or absence of specialist intermediaries between disputant and umpire; and a number 
of different approaches to adherence and enforcement." Roberts, Mediation in Family Disputes, 
46 Mou. L. REv. 537, 546 (1983). 
66. This would appear to be borne out by a practice direction, "A Judge or Registrar, before 
ordering an enquiry and report by a Court Welfare Officer, should, where local conciliation facili-
ties exist, consider whether the case is a suitable one for attempts to be made to settle any of the 
issues by the conciliation process, and if so, a direction to this effect should be included in the 
order. If conciliation fails, any report which is ordered must be made by an officer who did not act 
as a conciliator." Principal Register of the Family Division, CHILDREN: ENQUIRY AND REPORT 
BY A WELFARE OFFICER (1986). 
67. See Westcott, Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Conciliation, 47 Mon. L. 
REv. 215 (1984); see also PARKINSON, supra note 16, at 180 "[A] disappointing and poorly 
researched report . . " 
68. "Voluntary action has advantages which a public service does not, and is often a good 
way of applying local help so as to benefit individuals directly without the involvement of a bu-
reaucracy. The voluntary base of some present conciliation services gives them a good deal of 
strength. The enthusiasm and commitment of their personnel combines with a willingness to make 
effective use of limited budgets is a feature of conciliation schemes as it is of other areas of the 
voluntary sector. Some of this strength might be lost were these services to be provided by the State 
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but, one wonders to what extent this thinking reflects a reluctance to 
contemplate the more radical and more expensive reform which would 
necessarily be involved in the general introduction of out-of-court con-
ciliation. In any event, following a recommendation of the Inter-depart-
mental Committee,69 a project unit was set up in September 1985 to 
monitor and assess, over a three year period, the effectiveness and eco-
nomics of different forms of conciliation.70 The unit, located at the Uni-
versity of Newcastle, is due to report in 1988 and its recommendations 
will be potentially important to the future role of conciliation in Eng-
land, especially regarding the issue of public funding. 
a. Initial hearings. The Booth recommendations urge for concili-
ation in defended cases or those involving children. The proposal asks 
for an initial hearing before the registrar within ten weeks of the com-
mencement of divorce proceedings. The informal hearing's purpose 
would be to dispose of aspects of the matter through appropriate orders 
made by the registrar based upon the extent of the parties agreement; 
to define the issues in dispute and to make conciliation available. The 
decision whether to take part in conciliation should, in the view of the 
Booth Committee, rest with the spouses; but, the court at the initial 
hearing, should have power to refer the parties to a welfare officer "for 
the purpose of discussing the nature of conciliation and its relevance to 
the dispute .... "71 The process would be a two-stage one with actual 
conciliation only following an initial hearing concerned solely with the 
question of proceeding to conciliation. 
b. Confidential information. The major adjustments to existing 
procedure proposed in the Booth report follow from the view that "con-
ciliation should form a recognized part of the legal procedure" with the 
aim to "marshal such reasonableness and objectivity as exist and to di-
rect the parties towards solving the essentially practical problems which 
arise."72 The need for confidentiality concerning matters disclosed in 
conciliation gives some indication of the nature of the organ proposed to 
be implanted into the fundamentally adversary divorce process: "Our 
firm view is that conciliation requires that there should be a full and 
free exchange between the parties and that this is unlikely to occur if 
with a salaried professional staff." REPORT OF THE lNTF.R-DEPARTMENTAL CoMMITTEE ON 
CoNCTI.IATION, para. 5.11. 
69. !d. at para. 5.18-5.22. 
70. The lNTF.R-DHARTMENTAL COMMITTEE REPORT (para 3.14) notes the salient differ-
ences bet ween the various schemes. The variations are essentially different permutations of the 
stages in which the relevant personnel are involved. !d. al para. 3.14. 
71. /d. at para. 4.59. 
72. !d. at para. 3.11. 
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there is a possibility of matters disclosed in conciliation being referred 
to in subsequent proceedings."73 
E. Prospects of Reform Following The Booth Report 
What are the prospects of reform on the basis of the Booth recom-
mendations; if the report is shelved, can a way forward be predicted? 
The cost factor could well deter implementation of these progressive 
proposals. The initial hearing would mean that solicitors "may have to 
do significantly more work than they currently do . . . in undefended 
suits;"74 and, the powers that be may well balk at proposals which 
would inevitably produce an increased call on public funds through le-
gal aid payments. A failure to introduce in-court conciliation as part of 
the divorce process will, of course, mean that the existing and ex-
panding structure of conciliation services will continue to have a grow-
ing role, albeit, subject to local variations of form and availability. The 
possibility of a system whereby court-referred conciliation work is con-
tracted out to an independent service is questionable. This would be 
more cost effective than a system relying primarily on professional wel-
fare officers.711 
F. Developments of Conciliation In Scotland 
The development in Scotland of a wholly independent out-of-
court service may, given sufficient growth, demonstrate an advantage in 
a system free from association with the formal and, inevitably, to some 
degree legalistic divorce process. On the other hand, it could not match 
the uniform availability which is a feature of conciliation built into di-
vorce procedure.76 In a relatively small jurisdiction, a number of volun-
tary conciliation centers, serving the various regions, may achieve suffi-
cient rationalization and uniformity of service to avoid the need for a 
73. Id. at para. 4.60. 
7 4. !d. at app. 1 para. 2. 
75. PARKINSON, supra note 16, at 207-08. 
76. Scotland has no equivalent of the English registrar, a quasi-judicial officer of the court 
whose role lends itself well to convening an informal hearing with a view to encouraging concilia-
tion. Nor does Scotland have an equivalent of the English probation service operating as a sepa-
rate social welfare arm of the courts. Since the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (§ 27) forensic 
social reports have been provided by local authority welfare workers; but even before the Act the 
Scottish position was markedly different from the English probation service and probation officers 
had no significant role as conciliators in matrimonial work; See REPORT OF THE Dt:PARTMENTAL 
CoMMITTEE ON THE PROBATION SERVICE, para. 138. One researcher saw this difference as likely 
to mean that the Scottish legal profession would be slower to recognize the benefits of conciliation 
''[g]iven that conciliators are usually drawn from social work, and social workers and lawyers have 
less experience of working together than in England." See J FoRsn:R (The Scottish Council for 
Single Parents), DIVORCE CoNCILIATION at 14 (1982). 
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process-based system which could well be incapable of the level of suc-
cess of a service detached from the legal bureaucracy. This seems to be 
the way developments are moving under the umbrella body of the Scot-
tish Association of Family Conciliation Services formed in June 1986.77 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
As the above discussion demonstrates a number of related factors 
can be identified in the British developments towards the availability of 
some form of alternative dispute resolution in divorce. Both English 
and Scots law have made adjustments in recognition of the inevitability 
of widespread divorce in modern life. English law, especially, has at-
tempted to protect the threatened family unit by introducing reconcilia-
tion requirements as part of a package of divorce reform; however, 
these devices have proved to be impotent. Reform of the substantive 
grounds of divorce has been followed by some changes-or proposed 
changes-to the traditional contest based procedure. 
Most recently, the focus of attention has shifted towards concilia-
tion processes which, on the premise of unavoidable divorce, place the 
emphasis upon reducing the destructive intensity of litigation. Even 
though these developments have been different in England and Scotland 
there is a growing indication of a movement towards reconciliation in 
an attempt to protect children from the effects of divorce. 
From the point of view of legal institutions, what is happening in 
both England and Scotland illustrates an awareness of law concerned 
with people and their personal family relationships and the need to 
protect individuals from pragmatic forces generated by new social con-
ventions for divorce. This need is bringing about change in advance of 
actual law reform.78 Despite the inertia and procrastination which 
hamper efforts to reform family law and the structure of the courts, 
stones which are thrown into the family law pond do not necessarily 
sink without trace. The ripples have spread out from many local cen-
ters over the last ten years, not only in a widening circle of small prac-
tical experiments but more fundamentally in an interdisciplinary ap-
proach to the problems of marriage breakdown and divorce.79 
77. For an assessment of the first two years of the Scottish Family Conciliation Service, 
serving the Lothian area, see REPORT OF THE CENTRAL RESEARCH UNIT OF THE SCOTTISH 
OFFICE, THIRD REPORT, 1986. 
78. The most recent British development is solicitor mediation, involving a single legal prac-
titioner acting as neutral mediator on behalf of both parties. See Dyer, The Divorce Solicitors Who 
Don't Take Sides, LAw MAG. 33, 34(1987). 
79. PARKINSON, supra note 16, at 209. 
